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Game theory is the study of decision problems in which there are multiple decision makers, and the quality of a decision maker's choice depends on that choice as well as the choices of others. While game theory has been studied predominantly as modeling paradigm in the mathematical social sciences, there is a strong connection to control systems in that a controller can be viewed as a decision-making entity. Accordingly, game theory is relevant in settings in which there are multiple interacting controllers. This article presents an introduction to game theory, followed by a sampling of results in three specific control theory topics where game theory has played a significant role: (i) zero-sum games, in which two competing players are a controller and an adversarial environment, (ii) team games, in which several controllers pursue a common goal but have access to different information, and (iii) distributed control, in which both a game and online adaptive rules are designed to enable distributed interacting subsystems to achieve a collective objective.
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The textbook (1) defines game theory as "the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers." From a control theory perspective, one can interpret a control law as a sort of "intelligent rational decision-maker" that was designed to produced a desired effect. Accordingly, again from a control theory perspective, game theory can be viewed as the study of conflict and cooperation between interacting controllers, where the identities (who are the controllers?) and preferences (what are they trying to achieve?) depend on the specific setting.
One setting, which is one of conflict, where game theory and control theory have had a long standing connection are strictly competitive games, more commonly known as zero-sum games. There are two players, and what is to the benefit of one player is to the detriment of the other. The connection to control theory is as follows. A driving motivation for feedback is to assure satisfactory performance in the face of an uncertain environment (cf., the robust control literature as in (2)). From a conflict perspective, the controller is one player and environmental uncertainty is the other player.
Another setting, which is one of cooperation, that is connected to control theory is team games. Here, there can be many players, and the defining feature is that all players have the same preferences, typically expressed as a utility function. The complication is that different players have access to different information, and this distribution of information prohibits a conventional centralized controller implementation.
A third setting, which is neither strict conflict nor cooperation, is where a controller can be viewed as a collection of interacting subsystems that are distributed over an operating domain with limited communication capabilities (e.g., mobile sensor networks, robotic swarms, etc.) Each subsystem can be viewed as a player in a game, but now the challenge is to design the game itself (i.e., both preferences as well as online adaptation rules) to evoke a desirable emergent behavior of the collective subsystems (cf., (3, 4) ).
This paper begins with a basic introduction to the elements of game theory and proceeds with a limited sampling of selected results in each of these three settings.
Regarding the presentation, the analysis and theorems stated herein are presented in an informal manner. Technical details can be found in the associated references. Standard notation and basic concepts from control theory are used throughout, with clarifications provided as needed.
BASIC CONCEPTS
We begin with a review of some basic material. The discussion here is deliberately brief given the many texts on the topic of game theory directed to different audiences, including economics (5, 1, 6) , computer science (7, 8, 9) , and engineering (10, 11, 12) .
Game elements
A game is described by three elements. First, there is the set of players, P. We will limit the discussion to a finite set of players, i.e., P = {1, 2, ..., P } .
For each player, p ∈ P, there is a set of strategies, Sp. The joint strategy set is S = S1 × ... × Sp.
A joint strategy s ∈ S is represented as s = (s1, s2, ..., sP ).
We sometimes represent a joint strategy from the perspective of a specific player, p ∈ P, as s = (s1, ..., sp, ..., sP ) = (sp, s−p).
Here, s−p denotes the set of strategies of players in P\p, i.e., players other than player p. Finally, for each player p ∈ P, there is a utility function up : S → R that captures the player's preferences over joint strategies. That is, for any two joint strategies, s, s ∈ S, player p strictly prefers s to s if and only if up(s) > up(s )
i.e., larger is better. In case up(s) = up(s ), then player p is indifferent between joint strategies s and s . The vector of utility functions is denoted by u, i.e., u = (u1, u2, ..., uP ) : S → R P .
It is sometimes more convenient to express a game in terms of cost functions, rather than utility functions. In this case, for each player, p ∈ P, there is a cost function cp : S → R, and player p prefers the joint strategy s to s if and only if, cp(s) < cp(s ), i.e., smaller is better.
Examples
A game is fully described by the triplet of (i) the player set, P, (ii) the joint strategy set, S, and (iii) the vector of utility functions, u (or cost functions, c). The following examples illustrate the versatility of this framework.
2.2.1. Two-player matrix games. In a two-player matrix game, there are two players, labeled "row" and "column". Each player has a finite set of actions. Accordingly, the utility functions can be represented by two matrices, Mrow and M col , for the row and column player, respectively. The elements Mrow(i, j) and M col (i, j) indicate the utility to each player when the row player selects its i th strategy and the column player selects its j In this illustration, the row player's strategy set is labeled {T, B}, and the column player's strategy set is {L, R}. In this case,
In case the players have more than two (as in this example) strategies, then the matrix representations simply have more rows and columns.
The following are representative two-player matrix games that have received considerable attention for their illustration of various phenomena: Continuing with the discussion of two-player matrix games, let us redefine the strategy sets as follows. For any positive integer, n, define ∆[n] to be the n-dimensional probability simplex, i.e.,
Now redefine the strategy sets as follows. In case the matrices Mrow and
The strategies of each player can be interpreted as the probabilities of selecting a row or column. The utility functions over these randomized strategies are now defined as
These redefined utility functions can be identified with the expected outcome of the previous deterministic utility functions over independent randomized strategies.
Parallel congestion games.
In a parallel congestion game, there is a collection of parallel roads from A to B, R = {1, 2, ..., R} .
While there is a finite set of players, the number of players typically is much larger than the number of roads, i.e., P R. Each player must select a single road, and so the strategy set of each player is R. For each road, there is a function that expresses the congestion on that road as a function of the number of players using the road. That is, for each r ∈ R, there is a road-specific congestion function 1 κr : Z+ → R. 1 The symbol Z + denotes the set of non-negative integers, {0, 1, 2, ...}.
A natural assumption is that the congestion functions are increasing. For the joint strategy, s, let νr(s) denote the number of players such that ap = r, i.e., the number of users of road r.
Players seek to avoid congestion. Accordingly, the cost function of player p depends on the selected road, r, and the road selection of other players, s−p. In terms of the congestion functions, the cost function of player p evaluated at the joint strategy s = (r, s−p) is cp(r, s−p) = κr(νr(r, s−p)),
i.e., the congestion experienced on the selected road, r.
While this example is for parallel congestion games, one can define a similar setup for a network of roads and player-specific starting and destination points. See (13) for an extensive discussion.
Repeated prisoner's dilemma.
In the original presentation of the prisoner's dilemma in Section 2.2.1, the strategy set of each player was {C, D}, whose elements stand for "cooperate" and "defect", respectively.
We now consider a scenario in which the matrix game is played repeatedly over an infinite series of stages, t = 0, 1, 2, .... At stage t, both players simultaneously select an action in {C, D}. The actions are observed by both players, and the process repeats at stage t + 1 and so on. Let a(t) denote the joint actions of both players at stage t, so that a(t) can take one of four values: (C, C), (C, D), (D, C), or (D, D). At stage t, the observed history of play is H(t) = (a(0), a(1), ..., a(t − 1)).
Let H * denote the set of such finite histories. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, a strategy is a mapping s : H * → {C, D} .
In words, a strategy is a reaction rule that dictates the action a player will take as a function of the observed history of play. Two example strategies that have played an important role in the analysis of the prisoner's dilemma are "grim trigger", which is to select C, i.e., cooperate, as long as the other player has always cooperated:
D, otherwise;
and "tit-for-tat", which is to select the action that the other player previously selected:
Here, p stands for either the row or column player, and as usual −p stands for the other player.
To complete the description of the game, we still need to define the utility functions. Let s = (srow, s col ) denote a pair of strategies for the row and column players, respectively. Any pair of strategies, s, induces an action stream, a(0; s), a(1; s), .... Let Up(a(t; s)) denote the single stage utility to player p at stage t under the (strategy-dependent) joint action a(t; s). Now define the repeated game utility function:
where the discount factor, δ, satisfies 0 < δ < 1. In words, it is the future discounted sum of the single stage payoffs. The repeated prisoner's dilemma is an example of a dynamic game, which is a model of an evolving scenario. This example illustrates that the basic framework of Section 2.1 is versatile enough to accommodate (i) infinite strategy sets, since there is an infinite number of reaction rules, and (ii) utility functions that reflect payoff streams that are realized over an infinite time.
Nash equilibrium
Game theory has its origins in the mathematical social sciences as a modeling framework in settings that involve multiple decision making actors. As a modeler, one would like to propose an outcome, or solution concept, once the sets of players, strategies, and utility functions, have been specified. Nash equilibrium is one such proposal.
Note that there is an extensive literature-which is not discussed herein-that examines and critiques Nash equilibrium in the face of experimental evidence and presents a variety of alternative proposals (cf., (14, 15) ).
At a Nash equilibrium, each player's strategy is optimal with respect to the strategies of other players.
Definition 2.1
The set of strategies (s * 1 , s2, ..., s * P ) ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium, if for each p ∈ P,
An alternative representation is in terms of best response functions 2 .
Definition 2.2
The best response function BRp : S−p → 2 Sp is defined by
In words, BRp(s−p) is the set of strategies that maximize the utility of player p in response to the strategies, s−p, of other players. Note that there need not be a unique maximizer, and so BRp(s−p) is, in general, set-valued. In terms of the best response functions, a Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies, (s Two-player matrix games. For stag hunt, there are two Nash equilibria: (S, S) and (H, H). For the prisoner's dilemma, the sole Nash equilibrium is (D, D). Finally, for the Shapley fashion game, there is no Nash equilibrium. These examples illustrate that games can exhibit multiple, unique, or no Nash equilibria.
In the case of randomized strategies, stag hunt inherits the same two Nash equilibria, now expressed as probability vectors,
Furthermore, there is a new Nash equilibrium:
The prisoner's dilemma continues to have a unique Nash equilibrium. The Shapley fashion game now has a single Nash equilibrium
Parallel congestion games. At a Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to use a different road. Accordingly, all of the roads that are being used have (approximately) the same level of congestion.
Repeated prisoner's dilemma. One can show that grim trigger versus grim trigger constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the case that the discount factor, δ, is sufficiently close to 1. The standard interpretation is that cooperation can be incentivized provided that the players have a long term outlook. By contrast, the single stage (or even finitely repeated) prisoner's dilemma has a unique Nash equilibrium of always defect versus always defect.
ZERO-SUM AND MINIMAX DYNAMIC GAMES
In zero-sum games, there are two players with strategy sets S1 and S2, and the utility functions satisfy the zero-sum property:
u1(s1, s2) + u2(s1, s2) = 0, ∀s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2.
Accordingly, an increase in utility for one player results in a decrease in utility for the other player (by the same amount). Given this special structure, zero-sum games are usually expressed in terms of a single objective function, φ(s1, s2), that is the cost function of player 1 (the minimizer) and utility function of player 2 (the maximizer). In terms of the original formulation, φ(s1, s2) = −u1(s1, s2) = u2(s1, s2).
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The quantity val[φ] represents the best guaranteed cost for the minimizer in the worst-case scenario of its strategy, s1, being known to the maximizer. The quantity val[φ] has an analogous interpretation for the maximizing player. In general,
In the case of equality, the zero-sum game is said to have a value,
For zero-sum games, a Nash equilibrium is characterized by the following saddle point condition. The pair of strategies s * 1 and s * 2 is a Nash equilibrium if
This inequality indicates that s * 1 is the best response (for the minimizer) to s * 2 , and vice versa. In case a zero-sum game has a Nash equilibrium, then it has a value, with
The converse need not be true, depending on whether the associate infimum or supremum operations are achieved.
In control problems, one is often interested in a worst-case analysis against an environmental opponent. Taking the viewpoint that the control design is the minimizer, define
i.e., the worst case outcome as a function of the strategy s1. Let us call a strategy, s1, that achieves φwc(s1) ≤ a security strategy that guarantees . It may be the case that one is interested solely in constructing a security strategy (for the sake of establishing a guaranteed level of performance) without determining the optimal (which is val[φ]) or even whether or not a value or Nash equilibrium exists.
Pursuit-evasion games
Pursuit-evasion games have long received attention in the controls literature. A very early summary article is (16) , which also directs to the seminal work (17) . The following discussion follows (10, Section 8.2).
As the terminology implies, there is a mobile pursuer that is trying to approach a mobile evader. A typical modeling setup is that the pursuer, labeled "p", and evader, labeled "e", are modeled by controlled differential equationṡ
The pursuer and evader control inputs, u(t) ∈ U and v(t) ∈ V, respectively, may be subject to various constraints that model effects such as bounded velocity, acceleration, or turning radius, as captured by the sets U and V. Let x = x p x e denote the concatenated state vector. The evader is considered captured by the pursuer at time t if (x(t), t) = 0,
where the function (·, ·) can represent events such as the pursuer being sufficiently close to the evader. An example is the so-called homicidal chauffeur problem (17) , where the pursuer is faster than the evader, but the evader is more agile. These constraints are modeled in 2-D as follows. The pursuer is subject to Dubins' (or unicycle) dynamics:
with |u(t)| < 1. The evader is a simple integratoṙ
The constraints are v
where V e is the maximum evader velocity, and
We will be interested in finding closed-loop strategies for the the pursuer and evader of the form
which are time and state dependent feedback laws. One can also formulate alternative variations such as partial observations of the opponent's state, in which case a closed-loop strategy may be a function of the history of observations. Finally, we define an objective function of the form
where the final time, T , is defined as the smallest time where the termination condition of (eq. 1) is satisfied. An example setup from (16) is
In this formulation, the game ends in a specified terminal time, Tmax. The terminal objective is some quadratic function of the pursuer and evader states, such as the norm of the distance between the pursuer and evader locations. The integrated objective penalizes the weighted control energy of both the (minimizing) pursuer and (maximizing) evader.
Of course, the remaining challenge is to characterize strategies that constitute a Nash equilibrium. Note that for a fixed strategy of the opponent, the remaining player is left with a one sided optimal control problem (cf., (18) ). This insight leads to the Isaacs equation that defines a PDE for an unknown value function J(t, x). Let
denote the concatenated dynamics vector. The Isaacs equation is
If a solution to the Isaacs equation exists, then one can define strategies s p (t, x) and s e (t, x)
as the associated minimizer and maximizer, respectively. A sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium is the following: Backwards reachability. Suppose that the capture condition of (eq. 1) does not depend on time, but is only a function of the pursuer and evader states. Now define the goal set G0 = {x : (x) = 0} .
The backwards reachability problem (for the pursuer) is to find all states that can be driven to G0 regardless of the control inputs of the evader, i.e., a forced capture. Backwards reachability approaches are closely related to methods of set-invariance (e.g., (19) ) and viability theory (e.g., (20) ) and are connected to the forthcoming discussion on optimal disturbance rejection in Section 3.3.
It is convenient to describe the main idea using the discrete-time pursuit-evasion dynamics
subject to constraints u(t) ∈ U and v(t) ∈ V. First define the following set:
In words, G1 is the set of all states that can be forced (i.e., regardless of the evader's action, v) to the target set in one time step. Proceeding in a similar manner, recursively define
By construction, if ever x0 ∈ G k for some k, then the state trajectory starting from an initial condition of x0 can be forced to the target set in k time steps, again regardless of the evader's future actions. Alternatively, if an initial condition x0 does not lie in ∪ ∞ k=1 G k , then the evader can perpetually avoid the target set.
Reference (21) develops these ideas for continuous-time dynamics. In particular, the paper associates backwards reachability sets with a terminal penalty pursuit-evasion problem (the integral cost g(·) = 0 in (eq. 2)) and represents the set Gτ (for non-discrete values of τ ) as the level set of a numerically constructed function.
Approximate methods. The backwards reachability approach seeks to exactly characterize all states that lead to capture. An alternative is to exploit special simplified settings to derive a specific strategy that guarantees capture (not necessarily optimizing any specific criterion). One approach, taken in (22) , is to compute the Voronoi cell of the evader, i.e., the set of points that the evader can reach before the pursuer. The control law derived in (22) minimizes the instantaneous time rate of change of the area of the evader's Voronoi cell. Reference (22) goes on to derive the minimizing control law and establish that this control law guarantees eventual capture, where capture is defined as the proximity condition x p − x e ≤ δ, for some capture radius δ.
Reference (23) considers a probabilistic approach to compute an escape path for an evader, if one exists. The algorithm is based on random trajectory generation for both the evader and pursuer. The outcome is an open loop trajectory (i.e., not a feedback law) that, with high probability, guarantees escape for all trajectories of the pursuer. Here, "high probability" refers to a high probability of the algorithm producing a guaranteed escape trajectory-if one exists-but the movements of the evader and pursuer are not randomized. Randomized pursuit trajectories are considered in (24) . The game is played in a non-convex polygonal region, where the pursuer's objective is to have the evader in its line-of-sight. There it is shown that randomized open-loop pursuit trajectories can lead to capture in settings where deterministic trajectories can be perpetually evaded.
Note that the backwards reachability and approximate methods are more aligned with the aforementioned worst-case or minimax formulation in that they do not attempt to address the construction of a pair of strategies that constitute a Nash equilibrium. Rather, the objective is to derive a strategy for one of the players that guarantees a desired outcome regardless of the behavior of the other player.
Zero-sum linear-quadratic games and robust control
One of the foundational motivations for feedback control is to mitigate the effects of environmental uncertainty, which can come in the form of exogenous disturbances, model misspecification, and parameter variations, among others. The robust control program (e.g., (2)) sought to address such issues as optimization problems. Quoting the seminal work of Zames (25) , "can the classical 'lead-lag' controllers be derived from an optimization problem?".
There is an immediate connection to zero-sum or minimax games, where the controller (that is to be designed) is in direct competition with the uncertain environment. In this section, we review a problem of induced norm minimization that makes this connection explicit. See (26) for an extensive technical presentation as well as a historical overview.
The induced norm minimization problem is to design a controller that minimizes the effect of exogenous disturbances. This objective can be stated as follows. Let T [K] denote an operator that represents a closed-loop system as a function of the controller, K. For example (see (2)),
where P is the plant to be controlled, and W1 and W2 are dynamic weighting operators (e.g., frequency shaping filters). For any stabilizing controller, define the induced norm
We are interested in the optimization
In addition to the face value norm minimization, this objective function also is relevant to the problem of robust stabilization, i.e., stabilization in the presence of dynamic modeling uncertainty (cf., (27) ). One also can formulate optimal estimation problems in a similar manner (e.g., (28)). An example setup is the case of state feedback controllers. For the linear system,
u is the control signal, v is an exogenous disturbance, and z gathers signals to be made small in the presence of disturbances (e.g., tracking error, control authority, etc.). A state feedback controller, K ∈ R m×n , is stabilizing if A − BK is a stability matrix 4 . Given a stabilizing state-feedback, the closed-loop system iṡ
and the resulting induced norm is
along solutions of (eq. 4) with zero initial conditions (x0 = 0). Clearly this objective depends on the stabilizing K.
3 For a function f :
The eigenvalues have strictly negative real parts.
To make the connection to zero-sum games, we modify the problem slightly. Rather than attempting to minimize the norm, we ask the question of whether it is possible to make the induced norm less than some specified level, γ > 0, as in
By iterating on γ, one can then seek to derive controllers that make γ as small as possible. The associated objective function for the zero-sum game formulation, with u as the minimizer and v the maximizer, is
along solutions of (eq. 4), where it is not assumed that x0 = 0.
The following theorem combines the presentations in (26, Theorem 4.11) and (29) .
Theorem 3.2 Assume that the pair (A, B) is stabilizable and (A, C) is observable. The following statements are equivalent:
• The zero-sum game (eq. 5) has a value for any x0.
• There exists a positive definite solution to the Algebraic Riccati Equation
• There exists a stabilizing state feedback, K, such that T [K] ind,2 < γ.
If any of these are satisfied, the state feedback
The above is just a sample of the extensive results concerning linear-quadratic games. See (30) for a dedicated discussion.
Minimax dynamic programming
In the previous section, a large adversarial disturbance, v, was penalized in (eq. 5) by the energy term
but otherwise the disturbance could have an arbitrarily large magnitude. Another model of an adversarial disturbance is that it takes values in a bounded domain. This "unknownbut-bounded" approach has its origins in (31, 32) and is related to set-invariance methods (19) , viability theory (20) , and the previously discussed backwards reachability method of Section 3.1.
The discussion here follows (33, Sections 1.6 & 4.6.2). We consider discrete-time dynamics of the form x(t + 1) = f (x(t), u(t), v(t)), x(0) = x0, subject to constraints 5 u(t) ∈ U and v(t) ∈ V. We are interested in finding (possibly time-dependent) state feedback
over some time horizon, [0, 1, ..., T ]. Let µ denote a collection of state feedback laws (µ0(·), µ1(·), ..., µT −1(·)). The order of operations here is that the controller (or minimizer) commits to µ and then the constrained disturbance reacts to maximize the cost. The dynamic programming solution follows the recursive procedure of value iteration. Define
and recursively define the cost-to-go functions
Then by standard dynamic programming arguments, one can show that
g(x(t), µt(x(t)), v(t)) .
Furthermore, the optimal policy at stage t is the minimizing µt(x(t)) = arg min
The connection to zero-sum games is that minimax dynamic programming provides a procedure to construct an optimal security strategy from the perspective of the minimizer.
Controlled invariance. The problem of controlled invariance is to maintain the state in a specified region in the presence of disturbances. In the case of linear systems, consider x(t + 1) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + Lv(t), subject to 6 |v| ∞ ≤ 1 and |u| ∞ ≤ umax. Our objective is to maintain the state in the bounded region |x| ∞ ≤ 1. One can map this problem to the minimax dynamic programming approach by defining the stage and terminal costs as
Then an initial condition, x0, satisfies JT (x0) = 0 if and only if there exists a policy, µ, that assures the state will satisfy |x(t)| ∞ ≤ 1 for all t = 0, 1, ..., T .
One can mimic the backwards reachability algorithm to construct a representation of the cost-to-go functions, J k (·) as follows. Define G0 = x : |x| ∞ ≤ 1 and then define G1 = x : ∃u with |u| ∞ ≤ umax s.t. Ax + Bu + Lv ∈ G0, ∀ |v| ≤ 1 ∩ G0.
Then x0 ∈ G1 if and only if J1(x0) = 0, or equivalently there exists a control action that keeps |x(t)| ∞ ≤ 1 for t = 0 and t = 1. Proceeding recursively, define
Note that the only difference between this algorithm and that of backwards reachability is the recursive intersection. Although computationally costly, one can use polyhedral representations of these sets (e.g., (19) ). That is, one can recursively construct matrices,
By construction, JT (x0) = 0 if and only if x0 ∈ GT . Furthermore, subject to certain technical conditions (32) , if x0 ∈ ∩ ∞ k=0 G k , then there exists a policy that keeps |x(t)| ∞ ≤ 1 indefinitely.
It turns out the controlled invariance problem is also related to minimizing an induced norm of the form
where, for a function f :
This optimization is known as 1 optimal control (cf., (34) and references therein). The connection between 1 optimal control and controlled invariance was investigated in (35, 36) .
LPV optimal control. Linear parameter varying (LPV) systems are linear systems that depend on an exogenous time varying parameter whose values are unknown a priori. Stemming from the connection to the nonlinear design methodology of gain scheduling, the LPV paradigm can serve as a middle ground model between linear time invariant and nonlinear models. See (37) for an overview and further discussion. Consider the controlled discrete-time LPV dynamics
For this discussion, we will assume that the parameter takes on finite values, θ(t) ∈ Q, ∀t = 0, 1, 2, ...
for some finite set, Q. One can additional add constraints such as bounds on the rate of change, such as |θ(t + 1) − θ(t)| ≤ δmax.
We are interested in deriving a collection of state feedback laws (µ0(·), µ1(·), ..., µT −1(·)) to optimize sup θ(0),θ(1),...,θ(T −1)∈Q
g(x(t), µt(x(t))) along solutions of (eq. 6). This structure falls within the aforementioned minimax dynamic programming, where the game is between the control, u, and parameter, θ.
The following results, along with explicit computational methods, are presented in (38) .
Theorem 3.3
Assume that the stage cost has the polyhedral representation
Then there exists a sequence of matrices, M k , so that the cost-to-go functions of minimax dynamic programming satisfy
Furthermore, the stationary (receding horizon) feedback policy
asymptotically approximates the optimal infinite horizon policy for sufficiently large horizon lengths, T .
Asymmetric information and randomized deception
Thus far, we have assumed an environmental opponent that is all knowing in that we guard against all possible opponent actions after committing to a control policy. Another formulation of interest is where the opposing environment has limited information. A specific mathematical model is the setting of repeated zero sum matrix games. In a one-shot zero-sum game, there is a matrix, M ∈ R I×J , whose ij th element is the penalty to the (minimizing) row player and payoff to the (maximizing) column player when the row player uses its i th (out of I) action and column player uses its j th (out of J) action.
In a repeated zero-sum game, this game is repeated over a sequence of stages, t = 0, 1, 2, ... (cf., Section 2.2.4) and a strategy is a mapping from past actions over stages 0, 1, ..., t − 1 to the selected action in stage t. In the case of asymmetric information, the characteristic matrix, M , is selected by nature from a collection of possible matrices, M, as in
according to some known probability distribution, π ∈ ∆[K], where π k is the probability that the matrix, M k , is selected. The informed player knows which matrix was selected, whereas the uninformed player does not. Furthermore, a common assumption is that the uninformed player cannot measure the realized payoff at each stage. Accordingly, the strategy of the informed player can depend on the selected characteristic matrix, whereas the strategy of the uninformed player can only depend on past actions. Following the notation of Section 2.2.4, let H * denote the set of finite histories of play. Then a (behavioral) strategy for the informed row player is a mapping srow : H * × M → ∆[P ], whereas a strategy for the uninformed column player only depends on history of play, as in
This setup, as with more complicated variations, has received considerable attention dating back to the seminal work reported in (39) through the more recent monograph (40) . A motivating setting is network interdiction (e.g., (41, 42, 43) )). In network interdiction problems 7 , the activities of a network owner (defender) are being observed by an attacker.
The network owner is the informed player in that the owner knows the details of the network, e.g., which parts of the network are protected or susceptible. Based on these observations, the attacker will launch a limited attack to disable a portion of the network. The network owner faces a tradeoff of exploitation versus revelation. If the network owner exploits its superior information, it may it may reveal sensitive information to the attacker, and thereby increase the likelihood of a critical attack. Back to the repeated zero-sum game problem, it turns out that the optimal strategy of the informed player is to randomize its actions based on the following model of the uninformed player. First, assume that the uninformed player is executing Bayesian updates to compute the posterior probability
which is the posterior probability that the matrix M k was selected based on the observed sequence of past actions, H(t). The action of the uninformed player is then modeled as a myopically optimal randomized strategy with respect to these posterior probabilities:
A classic result (see (39) ) is that the informed row player's optimal security strategy is a best response to the above column player strategy. The resulting strategy will randomize according to probabilities that depend on both the stage of play as well as the online outcome of prior stages. One can think of this strategy as a deception attempt influence the posterior beliefs of the uninformed attacker. Recent work (42, 43) and (45, 46) presents efficient algorithms for the computation of these probabilities based on recursive linear programs.
TEAM GAMES
We now discuss another class of games that has had a long standing relationship with control theory, namely team games. In team games, there can be multiple players, 1, 2, ..., P . The defining characteristic is that all players have the same preferences. Recall S = S1 × ... × SP is the joint strategy set for players 1, 2, ..., P . In team games 8 , for some cost function,
While team games have been of interest for several decades (e.g., (47)), there has been a recent surge of interest related to distributed control applications, where there is no single centralized controller that has authority over all control inputs or access to all measurements (e.g., (48, 49 , 50, 51)) 9 .
The main issue in team games is that each player has access to different information. If all players had the same information, then one could approach the game as a conventional centralized control design problem. Players having different information can significantly complicate the characterization, and more importantly, the explicit and efficient computational construction of optimal strategies.
Another issue in team games is the distinction between team-optimal strategies and a Nash equilibrium. The joint strategy, s * , is team-optimal if
whereas the joint strategy s * is a Nash equilibrium if
In much of the team game literature, a Nash equilibrium is referred to as "person-by-person" optimal. Clearly, a team-optimal strategy is a Nash equilibrium, but the converse need not hold.
Static linear-quadratic team games
A classic result that dates back to (52) (the discussion here follows (47)) is as follows. There are P players, and player p can measure the scalar (for simplicity) random variable zp = Hpξ, where 10 ξ ∈ R n is Gaussian, ξ ∼ N (0, X), with X > 0, and Hp is a matrix of appropriate dimension. The strategy of player p is a mapping,
from a player's measurement, zp, to its actions, up, i.e., up = sp(zp). The common cost function is
where matrices Q = Q T > 0 and S are cost function parameters, and
Theorem 4.1 ( (52)) The unique Nash equilibrium strategies are team-optimal and linear, i.e., s * p (zp) = Fpzp for matrices Fp.
For this specific case, person-by-person optimality also implies team-optimality.
Information structures
In more general models, the measurements of each player can depend on the actions of other players, as in
for matrices Dpq. A specific case that has received considerable attention is the Witsenhausen counterexample (53) (see also (54)). Here, there are two players, and the random variable ξ = ξ1, ξ2 is in R 2 . The measurements are
and the joint cost function is
for positive weights α, β > 0. The standard interpretation of this example is that player 1, through its action u1, faces the dual objective to either cancel the disturbance effect of ξ1 or signal its own value to u2 to overcome the noise effect of ξ2. Despite the linear-quadratic look-and-feel of this example, it was shown in (53) that there exist nonlinear team-optimal strategies that strictly outperform the best linear strategies.
The team-optimality of nonlinear strategies leads to the question of understanding when is the case that linear strategies are team-optimal. This question ultimately relates to the desire to explicitly construct team-optimal strategies. For example, one well-known case is that of partially nested information. Continuing with the general formulation of (eq. 7), suppose that the measurements can be decomposed as follows:
where the sets Op are defined as
In words, the measurement of player p includes the information of player q whenever the action of player q impacts the measurement of player p (as indicated by Dpq = 0).
Theorem 4.2 ((55))
Under partially nested information, team-optimal strategies are unique and linear.
Again, person-by-person optimality implies team-optimality.
Common information
A more recent development for team games exploits when players have some measurement information in common (56, 57) . To establish the approach, consider a variation of the setup in Section 4.1. Let ξ be a random variable, and let z0, z1, z2 be three random variables that are functions of ξ. For this discussion, there are two players. Player 1 measures (z0, z1), and player 2 measures (z0, z2). As before, each player's strategy is a mapping from its measurements to an action, and so
The common cost function is
We see that both players have access to the common information, z0.
The approach in (56, 57) is to transform the team-problem into a centralized optimization as follows. First, let z0, z1, z2, u1, and u2 take values in the sets Z0, Z1, Z2, U1, and U2, respectively. Define S1 to be the set of mappings
Finally, let R denote the set of mappings
Now imagine a hypothetical coordinator that has access to the common information, z0. Upon obtaining a measurement, the coordinator recommends a pair of mappings r1(·; z0) and r2(·; z0) to the two players to apply to their private information, z1 and z2, respectively. The optimization problem for the coordinator is then
i.e., to derive the optimal recommended mappings. The main results in (56, 57) establish conditions under which the optimal recommendations, (r * 1 (·; z0), r * 2 (·; z2)) constitute teamoptimal strategies, with the association
Dynamic settings
The discussion thus far has been restricted to static games, where there is no explicit 11 underlying dynamical system. The question of the structure of team-optimal controllers in dynamic games also has received significant interest. A prototypical setup (here with two players) is stochastic linear dynamics
where a strategy, s1, for player 1 is a dynamical system mapping measurements, y1(·), to control actions, u1(·). Likewise, a strategy, s2, for player two is a dynamical system mapping measurements, y2(·), to control actions, u2(·). The common cost function to be minimized is
for some positive definite weighting matrices Q, S, and Σ.
Of particular interest is when the structure of the dynamics and measurements admit linear team-optimal strategies whose computation is tractable. Examples include one-step delay information sharing (e.g., (58, 59, 60) , funnel causality (61), or quadratic invariance (62).
GAME THEORETIC DISTRIBUTED CONTROL
In this section we begin to view game theory from a design perspective as opposed to the primarily analytical focus discussed in the preceding sections. Our motivation for this new direction is the problem of distributed control, which focuses on systems where decisionmaking is distributed throughout the system. More formally, each system is comprised of several individual subsystems, each constrained to making independent decisions in response to locally available information. Some examples are:
• Networking routing: In network routing, the goal of a system operator is to allocate demand over a network to optimize a given measure of performance, e.g., throughput (63, 64) . In most situations, centralized routing policies are infeasible as routing decisions are made at a far more local level. A broader discussion of network applications can be found in (65, 66) .
• Wind farms: Wind farm control seeks to optimize the power productio. It is widely known that employing control strategies where the individual turbines independently optimize their own power production is not optimal with regards to optimizing the power production in the wind farm (67, 68, 69, 70) .
• Area coverage: In coverage problems, there is a collection of mobile sensors in an unknown environment that seeks to maximize the area under surveillance. Furthermore, some portions of the environment may carry more weight than others. Applications range from following an drifting spill to deployment for intruder detection (71, 72, 73) .
The overarching goal of such distributed control problem is to characterize admissible decision-making policies for the individual subsystems which ensure the emergent collective behavior is desirable. The design of distributed control policies can be derived from a game theoretic perspective, where the subsystems are modeled as players in a game with designed utility functions. We no longer view equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium as plausible outcomes of a game. Rather, we view these equilibrium concepts as stable outcomes associated with distributed learning where the individual subsystems adjust their behavior over time in response to information regarding their designed utility function and the behavior of the other subsystems.
The following sections present highlights of a game theoretic approach. Two recent overview articles are (3, 4).
Learning in Games
We begin by focusing on the question of how players can reach an equilibrium. To that end, we consider the framework of repeated one-shot games where a game is repeated over time, and players are allowed to revise their strategy over time in response to available information regarding previous plays of the game (74) . More formally, consider any finite strategic form game with player set, P, finite strategy sets, S, and utility functions, u. A repeated one-shot game yields a sequence of strategy profiles s(0), s(1), s (2), . . . , where at any time t ≥ 1, the strategy profile s(t) is derived from a set of decision-making rules D = (d1, . . . , dn) of the form sp(t) = dp(s(0), s (1), . . . , s(t − 1); up),
meaning that each player adjusts their strategy at time t using knowledge of the previous decisions of the other players as well as information regarding the structural form of the player's utility function. Any learning algorithm that can be expressed in this form is termed uncoupled, as players are not allowed to condition their choice on information regarding the utility functions of other players. An example of a decision-making rule of this form is the well-studied best response dynamics where
where BRp(·) is the best response set defined in Definition 2.2. In the best response dynamics, each player selects a best response to the behavior of the other players at the previous play of the game. An alternative class of learning algorithms to (eq. 8) that imposes less informational demands on the players is termed completely uncoupled dynamics or payoff-based dynamics, c.f., (75, 76, 77) and is of the form: sp(t) = dp(up(s(0)), up(s(1)), . . . , up(s(t − 1))).
In completely uncoupled dynamics, each agent is now only given the payoff the agent received at each play of the game. A player is no longer able to observe the behavior of the other agent or access the utility that the agent would have received for any alternative choices at any stage of the game. In problems such as network routing, learning algorithms of the form (eq. 10) may be far more reasonable than those in (eq. 8).
Ignoring the informational demands for the moment, the theory of learning in games has sought to establish whether there exists distributed learning algorithms of the form (eq. 8) that will always ensure that the resulting collective behavior reaches a Nash equilibrium. The following theorem demonstrates the inherent challenges associated with such a goal.
Theorem 5.1 ((75) ) There are no natural dynamics of the form (eq. 8) that converge to a pure Nash equilibrium for all games.
The term "natural" given in Theorem 5.1, which we will not explicitly define here, seeks to eliminate learning dynamics that exhibit phenomena like exhaustive search or centralized coordination. A key point of emphasis regarding this negative result is the phrase for all games, which effectively means that there are complex games for which no natural dynamics exist that converges to a Nash equilibrium. A central question that we seek to address here is whether a system designer can exploit the freedom to design the players' utility functions to avoid this negative result?
Game Structures
In this section, we turn our attention to games that possess an underlying structure that negates the negative result given in Theorem 5.1. One such class of games, termed potential games (78) , is defined as follows:
Definition 5.1 A game (P, S, u) is a potential game if there exists a potential function φ : S → R such that for any strategy profile s ∈ S, player p ∈ P, and strategy s p ∈ S√,
In a potential game, each player's utility is directly aligned with a common potential function in the sense that the change in the utility that a player would receive by unilaterally deviating from a strategy sp to a new strategy s p when all other players are selecting s−p is equal to the difference of the potential function over those two strategy profiles. Note that there is no mention of what happens to the utility of the other players j = i across these two strategy profiles. There are several desirable properties regarding potential games that are of interest to distributed control. First, a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in any potential game as any strategy s ∈ arg maxs∈S φ(s) is a pure Nash equilibrium. Second, there are natural dynamics that do in fact lead to a pure Nash equilibrium for any potential game. In fact, the following mild modification of the best response dynamics given in (eq. 12), termed best response dynamics with inertia, accomplishes this goal:
BRp(s−p(t)) with probability (1 − ), sp(t − 1) with probability ,
where > 0 is referred to as the players inertia (79) . More formally, the learning algorithm in (eq. 12) converges almost surely to a pure Nash equilibrium in any potential game. Similar positive results also hold for relaxed versions of potential games, e.g., generalized ordinal potential games or weakly acyclic games (79), which seeks to relax (eq. 11) either through the equality or the condition for all players. One of the other interesting facets abouts potential games is the availability of distributed learning algorithms that exhibit equilibrium selection properties, i.e., learning algorithms that favor one Nash equilibrium over other Nash equilibrium. For example, consider the algorithm log linear learning (c.f., (80, 81, 82, 83) ) where at each time t ≥ 1 a single agent i is given the opportunity to revise its strategy, i.e., s−p(t) = s−p(t − 1), and this updating player adjusts its choice according to the following mixed strategy where sp(t) = sp with probability e β·up(sp,s −p (t−1))
where β > 0. For any β ≥ 0 this process induces an aperiodic and irreducible Markov process over the finite strategy set S with a unique stationary distribution q = {q s }s∈S ∈ ∆(S). In the case that the game is a potential game, the stationary distribution satisfies
which means that when β → ∞, the support of the stationary distribution is contained on the strategy profiles with highest potential value.
Efficiency Guarantees
A key facet of any distributed control problem is a measure of the performance of the collective behavior, which we will define by a non-negative welfare function W : S → R.
Further, we will now define a game by the tuple (P, S, u, W ). Consider a game G where a pure Nash equilibrium is known to exist. We will measure the efficiency of this Nash equilibrium according to the following two worst-case measures, termed the price of anarchy and price of stability, defined as follows (84):
PoS(G) = max
where we use the notation s ne ∈ G to mean a pure Nash equilibrium in the game G. The price of anarchy seeks to bound the performance of any pure Nash equilibrium relative to the optimal strategy profile, while the price of stability focuses purely on the best Nash equilibrium. Note that 1 ≥ PoS(G) ≥ PoS(G) ≥ 0. Now consider a family of games G where a pure Nash equilibrium is known to exist for each game G ∈ G. The price of anarchy and price of stability extend to this family of games G in the following manner:
PoS(G) = min G∈G PoS(G).
In essence, the price of anarchy and price of stability provide worst-case performance guarantees when restricting attention to a specific type of equilibrium behavior.
Utility Design
We now turn to the question of how to design agent utility functions. To that end, suppose that a system operator has knowledge of the player set P, an over estimate of the strategy setsS = jS j , and a welfare function W :S → R. By over estimate, we mean that the true strategy sets satisfy Sp ⊆Sp for all i, but the system designer does now know this information a priori. Accordingly, the question that we seek to address here is whether a system design can commit to a specific design of agent utility functions that ensures desirable properties irrespective of the chosen strategy sets S. The following theorem from (85, 86, 87, 88) provides one such mechanism. 
where s BL p ∈Sp is a fixed baseline strategy. Then for any game G = (P, S, u, W ) where Sp ⊆Sp for all p, the game G is a potential game with potential function W restricted to the domain S.
Consider the family of games G induced by the utility design mechanism given in (eq. 19) for any baseline strategy s BL . Theorem 5.2 implies that the price of stability satisfies PoS(G) = 1, or alternatively that the optimal strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium for any game G ∈ G, i.e., any realization with strategy sets Sp ⊆Sp. Not only is the optimal strategy profile a pure Nash equilibrium, but this optimal strategy profile is also the potential function maximizer. Consequently, by appealing to the algorithm log-linear learning defined above, one can ensure that the resulting collective behavior is near-optimal when β is sufficiently high. (91, 92) , network coding problems (93) , set covering problems (94), routing problems (64, 95) , and more general cost sharing problems with a restriction to utility design mechanisms that enforce p up(s) = W (s) for all s ∈ S (96, 97, 98).
Local Utility Design.
The utility design given in Theorem 5.2 also makes no reference with regards to the structure, or the informational dependence / locality of the derived utility functions. This question has been looked at extensively in the cost sharing literature where agents' utility functions are required to depend only on information regarding the selected resources, e.g., in a network routing problems the utility of a player for selecting a route can only depend on the edges within that route and the other players that selected these edges. Confined to such local agent utility functions, (99) derived the complete set of local agent utility functions that ensure the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium; however, optimizing over such utility functions to optimize the price of anarchy is very much an open question as highlighted above. Other recent work in (100, 101, 102) introduced a state in the game environment as a design parameter to design player objective functions of a desired locality.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has presented an overview of selected topics in game theory of particular relevance to control systems, namely zero-sum games, team games, and game theoretic distributed control. Of course with limited space, there are bound to be some major omissions. Not discussed herein include:
• General sum dynamic games: These are dynamic games that need not be zero-sum or team games. Of particular interest is the existence of Nash equilibria (see (103) for a summary) as well as reduced complexity solution concepts (e.g., (104, 105) ).
• Large population games: Here, there is a very large number of players that can be approximated as a continuum. A general reference is (106) , and a recent overview tailored to a control audience is (107) . Also related to large populations is the topic of mean-field games (108).
• Cooperative game theory: All of the models discussed thus far fall under the framework of non-cooperative game theory. Cooperative game theory is an complementary formalism that relates to problems such bargaining, matching, and coalition formation (e.g., see (109, 110, 111) for various engineering applications). A recent overview tailored to a control audience is (112) .
